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GENRE AND AUTHORITY: THE RISE OF CASE REPORTING
IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES
DENIS P. DUFFEY, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The common-law tradition continued; as a sphere of customary law
rather than of positive, bureaucratic law, it required no original
authority and could even be said to be authoritative because its
origins lay beyond memory.
-Michael Warner, The Letters of the Republic'
Although common law adjudication did continue after the
American Revolution, it did so on a radically different basis. Rather
than being a mechanism for the application of customs whose
authority derived from immemoriality and shared usage, American
adjudication increasingly came to be regarded as an instrument for
promoting the public good whose authority derived from the will of
the people.2 The rise of this new conception of adjudication posed a
substantial threat to common law authority, however; as demon-
strated by the persistent calls for codification of the common law
during the decades following the Revolution, many found judicial
lawmaking to be inconsistent with the positivist, instrumentalist, and
reformist enthusiasms that were coming to dominate the legal culture.
Out of this volatile new legal environment there emerged a new
genre of legal literature: the printed American case report. Contem-
porary attitudes about the place of the reports in the changing legal
landscape were articulated in prefaces to volumes of reports and in
reviews of reports published in periodicals of the day. Based in part
on these sources, this essay argues that the institutional conditions
and formal characteristics of American case reporting helped protect
* Law clerk to the Honorable Diana Gribbon Motz, United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit. M.A. English, Columbia University, 1994; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1998.
I thank Eben Moglen for motivation and guidance in the preparation of this essay. I also thank
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1. MICHAEL WARNER, THE LET'TERS OF THE REPUBLIC 99 (1990).
2. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 22-23 (1977).
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common law authority against the potentially destructive effects of
post-Revolutionary legal ideology. Case reporting, though initially
motivated by a spirit of reform, soon came to operate as a mechanism
for insulating common law authority from hostile reformist influ-
ences. This insulation was achieved in part through the growing
prevalence of official reporting and judge-written opinions during the
early nineteenth century. By affiliating the common law with the very
kind of positive, bureaucratic authority that Warner identifies as alien
to it, these developments provided adjudication with a degree of the
legitimacy that statutes derived from their legislative authorization
and from their textuality. Other changes that the rise of reporting
worked upon the form of decisional literature also helped put
common law authority on a more secure footing in the face of
republican attacks.
I. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF PRINTED REPORTS: THE
IMPROVABILITY OF THE COMMON LAW
Printed case reports in the early Republic owed their origin to
the efforts of attorneys and judges who, acting on their own initiative,
sought to make the law of the country more certain and uniform. As
noted by Ephraim Kirby, one of the very first American case
reporters, 3 the English common law was not suited to this task
because differing conditions in America had given rise to legal
practices distinct from those in England.4 Other early reporters
implicitly distinguished American and English common law by
similarly claiming that American case reports were necessary for the
uniform administration of justice in America.' Without American
case reports to make the points of difference visible, citizens and
practitioners could not know the law. From early on, the printing of
American case reports represented an acknowledgment of the
substantive differences between American and English common law.
Furthermore, case reporting itself was understood not solely as an aid
to the profession, but also as a mechanism for reform. In Kirby's
description, American courts began their period of independence in
3. See EPHRAIM KIRBY, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (Litchfield, Collier & Adam 1789); see also FRANCIS HOPKINSON,
JUDGMENTS IN ADMIRALTY IN PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, T. Dobson 1789).
4. See KIRBY, supra note 3, at iii-iv.
5. See, e.g., ALEXANDER ADDISON, REPORTS OF CASES IN THE COUNTY COURTS OF THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT AND IN THE HIGH COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF THE STATE OF
PENNSYLVANIA vii-viii (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1883); 1 Cranch iii-v (1804).
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need of repair-repair which printed texts could effectuate.6 Thus,
from the outset of the Republican period, America's judicial institu-
tions were seen as (1) different from those of England, (2) in need of
reform, and (3) amenable to improvement through the efficacy of
print.7
These early case reports thus reflect a shift from a view of
common law as consisting of immemorial English customs to a view
in which it consisted, at least in part, of new American practices
improvable through intentional reform. While a notion of common
law as custom persisted, the focus on improvement in judicial institu-
tions hinted at the instrumental approach to adjudication which
would soon arise. It is important to note that published reports were
themselves put forth as the proper means of reform. As described
more fully below, emphasizing the value of published reports posited
textuality as the primary medium of common law authority-a
strategy particularly congenial to American tastes. Thus, at the very
beginning of American law reporting, print is identified as the means
both to improve adjudication in the United States and to make it
more American.
II. OFFICIAL REPORTING AND WRITFEN OPINIONS
The early reporters' views about the value of printed American
reports, however, were not shared widely enough for case reporting
to thrive as a private enterprise in all jurisdictions. 8 Between 1804 and
1814, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Kentucky, and
Connecticut passed statutes that provided reporters with official
status and financial support.9 Legislation passed by Congress and the
North Carolina and Virginia legislatures between 1817 and 1820 not
only made reporters official and provided them with income, but also
6. See KIRBY, supra note 3, at v.
7. See, e.g., ALEXANDER J. DALLAS, REPORTS OF CASES RULED AND ADJUDGED IN THE
COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA (Frederick C. Brightly ed., New York, Banks & Brothers 1889)
(1790) (identifying an existing, uniform system of jurisprudence as one of the ends of his work).
8. That lack of sales was a problem for reporters is indicated by the cessation of the
practice for that reason in Kentucky until after the state's official reporter statute was passed
and also by reporters' statements of concern about sales in prefaces. See, e.g., ADDISON, supra
note 5, at 7; 1 JOHN GALLISON, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT iii-iv (Boston, Wells & Lilly
1815).
9. See Act of May Session, 1814, ch. 25, 1814 Conn. Pub. Acts 25; Act of Feb. 20, 1808, ch.
15, 1808 Ky. Acts 15; Act of Mar. 1, 1806, ch. 115, 1806 N.J. Laws 105; Act of Apr. 7, 1804, ch.
68, 1804 N.Y. Laws. 68; Act of Mar. 8, 1804, 1804 Mass. Acts 68.
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sought to control the speed and quality of their publications.10 As
official reporting became widespread, a new justification of the value
of reporting became visible. Comments by reviewers and reporters
indicate that case reporting was understood to be directed not only at
improving judicial administration and aiding litigants by making the
law known," but also at controlling courts by making their decisions
subject to public scrutiny. 12 As one reviewer noted:
[Reporting makes judges] answerable, not only to parties and the
power of the state, but to the tribunals of judicial and professional
opinion. They cannot sin in defiance of the opinion of other judges
and the profession of the law;-at least they cannot, unless their
minds are of the lowest order, and unless they feel responsibility
only to the power that may deprive them of office, and to the
sympathetic opinion of the vulgar.'3
From this perspective, reporting looks more like an instrument of
discipline than an administrative reform. 4 And as the reviews
indicate, published reports did indeed result in scrutiny and criticism
of cases."i
By prompting a critical attitude toward adjudication, the official
10. See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, 3 Stat. 63 (1817); Act of Feb. 24, 1820, ch. 17, 1820 Va. Acts;
Act of 1818, ch. 2, para. XIII, 1818 N.C. Sess. Laws 2. The passage of these statutes, as well as
the passage of the Connecticut official reporter statute in 1814, may have been motivated in part
by nationalism associated with the War of 1812.
11. See 1 Mill x-xi (1819); Johnson's Reports, Vol. XIX, 1 U.S. L.J. 174, 202 (1822)
[hereinafter Johnson's Reports]; Miscellaneous and Literary Intelligence, 3 N. AM. REV. 433,
433-34 (1816); Wheaton's Reports, 5 N. AM. REV. 110, 111 (1817) [hereinafter Wheaton's
Reports] (reviewing 1 HENRY WHEATON, REPORTS OF CASES, ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1816)); Tyng's Reports of Cases Argued and
Determined in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 7 N. AM. REV. 184, 187 (1818)
[hereinafter Tyng's Reports] (reviewing 14 DUDLEY ATKINS TYNG, REPORTS OF CASES
ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS (1818)).
One desired effect of making the laws known, of course, was to constrain the exercise of
judicial discretion by educating judges about controlling precedents. See LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 324 (2d ed. 1985) (noting that preface to Cranch's
first volume of reports in 1804 cited limiting judicial discretion as one of main values of printed
reports). The idea that reports would subject judges' opinions to external scrutiny and criticism
is a different one, and it appears to have arisen slightly later.
12. See Wheaton's Reports, supra note 11, at 112-13; Wheaton's Reports, Vol. iii, 8 N. AM.
REV. 62, 67 (1818) (reviewing 3 HENRY WHEATON, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND
ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1818)).
13. Wheaton's Reports, Vol. iii, supra note 12, at 67.
14. See also Pickering's Reports, 20 N. AM. REV. 180, 182 (1825) (reviewing 1 OCTAVIUS
PICKERING, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS (1823)).
15. See, e.g., Nathaniel Adams, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Superior
Court of Judicature of the State of New Hampshire, from September, 1816, to February, 1819, 1
U.S. L.J. 510 (1819); Johnson's Reports, supra note 11, at 174-206; Thomas Sergeant & William
Rawle, Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1 L. INTELLIGENCER
123 (1829); Tyng's Reports, supra note 11, at 188-94.
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reporter statutes furthered the transformation of the common law
from a bastion of immemorial custom to an ordinary governmental
institution susceptible to regular, externally motivated reform. One
reviewer, after criticizing a number of New York cases, noted the
novelty of the activity:
It has not been usual, as far as we know, to criticise judicial
decisions in the manner we have now been doing; but we cannot
imagine, as we have already observed, why it should not be
done .... A fair and candid discussion of the principles that are
from time to time adjudged in our courts of justice, appears to us to
be perfectly admissible, and we think it is calculated to do much
good .... 16
This reviewer exhibits an awareness of his critical attitude toward
adjudication as a break with the past, but then sets forth a rhapsodic
defense of the common law: "We have always been in the habit of
regarding [the common law] ourselves, with a sort of holy reverence;
our admiration of it, and our affection for it, are almost without
limits, and it is our pride and pleasure to cherish these feelings .... "17
Cases could properly be criticized but, according to this reviewer,
only to protect the common law from erosion by faulty decision-
making. Even making allowances for the elaborate prose style of the
period, however, this reviewer's extravagant defense of the common
law suggests a reaction to anxiety about the continued force of
common law authority.
Ironically, though, the reviewer's own activity in criticizing the
cases points to how reports may have helped establish a new basis for
adjudicatory authority. By making the actions of the court visible and
subject to constant analysis and criticism, reports domesticated adju-
dication. No longer a matter of lawyers and judges applying alien,
abstract, rigid doctrines in courtrooms, reports made the common law
part of an ongoing, communal discussion conducted in the light of
day.
The serial form of reports may have contributed to the
impression of the common law as a flexible, participatory enterprise.
Adjudication was not a matter of rigid, arcane doctrine; rather, it was
a continual, active public process-a process whose character was
represented in material form by the everflowing stream of reports.
Furthermore, the practice of reviewing reports, and the attitude
toward the courts that it implied, situated adjudication in a world of
16. Johnson's Reports, supra note 11, at 207.
17. Id. at 208.
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ongoing political commentary in the public press. This literary envi-
ronment had become associated with republicanism during the
colonial period, as indicated by the popularity of serials such as The
Spectator and Cato's Letters. 8 As serials, the reports could function
not just as a topic but also as a participant in this kind of perpetual
civic discourse. Because republicans saw this sort of ongoing political
commentary as necessary to the political legitimacy of any society, 19
the fact that the common law was now engaged in such commentary
may have helped undermine claims that it was incompatible with
republican principles.
On another level, the rise of printed, authorized reports
consisting largely of judge-written opinions 2t affected the authority of
the common law by distributing responsibility for reporting in most
jurisdictions21 among legislatures, judges, and reporters. In England,
the notions of immemoriality22 and shared custom gave the common
law special authority by making it theoretically independent of any
particular individual or body. After the Revolution, however,
immemoriality and shared custom could not provide American
adjudication with the same degree of independent authority that the
English common law had enjoyed. By making England into an Other,
the Revolution asserted a cessation in the sharing of governmental
practices and associated the common law with a particular-and
alien-sovereign power. Nonetheless, some similar ground of
authority would have been particularly desirable in the United States,
given the acute suspicion with which Americans regarded the
assignment of ultimate governmental authority to any particular body
of humans.
23
The adoption of provisions establishing the English common law
as part of the law of the various states could arguably be seen as one
18. See WARNER, supra note 1, at 65.
19. See id.
20. Many states, starting with Connecticut in 1785, passed statutes requiring judges to issue
their opinions in writing. As Surrency suggests, however, "statutes requiring the reduction of
opinions to writing essentially formalized an existing practice." ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 43 (1990).
21. Pennsylvania is a notable exception to the trend in favor of authorized reports, and
provided no official support for reporting prior to 1845. See Act of Apr. 11, 1845, No. 250, 1845
Pa. Laws 250; SURRENCY, supra note 20, at 41. The state did, however, pass an act in 1806 which
required courts to produce written opinions at the request of either party. See Act of Feb. 24,
1806, ch. 122, § 25, 1806 Pa. Laws 25.
22. See WARNER, supra note 1, at 99 (describing common law as authoritative "because its
origins lay beyond memory").
23. See id. at 103-04.
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response to this problem.24 In addition to providing clarity in an
uncertain situation, these provisions buttressed the authority of the
common law with explicit constitutional or legislative sanction. They
may also have lent support to the common law by keeping it from
becoming solely associated with the judiciary. The mere knowledge
that these provisions were on the books, however, offered the courts
scant assistance in the face of the hostility to the common law that
developed in the decades that followed. The statutes authorizing
reporting provided American decisional law with another infusion of
the kind of "agency-obscuring '25 authority upon which the English
common law had been founded. By diffusing the responsibility for the
dissemination of decisional law to the public among the legislature,
the judges, and the reporters, American common law could present
itself to the world as the product of American government, rather
than the product of the judiciary alone. Comments in the reviews
indicate that the role of the legislature was regarded as significant 26
and that official reporters were viewed as public trustees constrained
by their duty to the government.
27
The combined effects of authorized reporting and the rise of
judge-written opinions may also have enhanced common law
authority by altering the particular relation between adjudicatory
authority and the public. By taking some of the responsibility of
reporting away from reporters, these changes gave citizens regular
and relatively direct access to American judicial pronouncements,
thereby possibly reducing anxieties about the anti-republican charac-
ter of common law adjudication. Judge-written opinions, in particular,
put adjudicatory authority into a form likely to appeal to Americans'
Protestant and democratic sensibilities, in that it gave them compara-
tively unmediated contact with authoritative texts. The reduced status
of the reporter should not be exaggerated, however. Reporters
appear to have had discretion over which cases to report in most
instances, and reports were still largely referred to by the name of the
reporter, producing, "a definite feeling ... that the reporter was far
24. See HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 4.
25. See WARNER, supra note 1, at 106-07 (referring to the value of the Constitution's
textuality).
26. See Pickering's Reports, supra note 14, at 183; Tyng's Reports, supra note 11, at 188.
27. See, e.g., Pickering's Reports, supra note 14, at 191 (criticizing Pickering for questioning
whether a case not found by the court or the reporter would have affected the decision in one
case, and noting that there are "many reasons why a reporter, more especially an official one,




more important than the judges who rendered the decisions. 28
At the same time, the reduction of the reporters' responsibilities
made it possible for them to take a laissez-faire approach to their
work. Instead of being individual entrepreneurs or craftsmen with
sole control over whether and how they would produce their
products, authorized reporting and written opinions permitted
reporters to operate as state employees assigned to package a largely
preexisting product for distribution. Some reporters were criticized
harshly for simply reporting whatever the court handed down without
selecting, editing, or usefully annotating the opinions:
The truth appears to be, that Mr. Cowen, as Mr. Johnson did
before him, finds the mechanical labour of copying cases, and
special verdicts, and pleadings, & c. much easier, as well as more
profitable, than the intellectual exertion of making abstracts of
their most material parts. His general practice is to insert them
entire .... This is not a fair and faithful discharge of his duty.
29
Certainly most reporters were more selective than Johnson and
Cowen, but they may nonetheless have been subject to similar
influences to a lesser degree. The ventriloquistic approach to
reporting taken by Johnson and Cowen implied that everything the
court did or said was, like legislation, a matter of public record which
ought to be disseminated in print. Insofar as this approach shaped
reporting practice, it may thus have contributed to the assimilation of
adjudication with other forms of governmental activity described
above. This more deferential attitude toward reporting may also help
account for the vastly greater proliferation of repoits in America than
in England. By reducing the reporters' level of responsibility,
American reporting practices took reporters out of the courtroom
and study and placed them on a case report assembly line.
Official reporting and written opinions thus fortified common
law authority in several ways. The rise of official reporting enhanced
adjudicatory authority by exposing the American common law to
public scrutiny, thereby enabling it to participate in characteristically
American and republican civic discourse. Authorized reporting may
also have helped mitigate hostility to common law authority by
associating adjudication more closely with the government as a whole.
The growing use of written opinions during the period contributed to
28. SURRENCY, supra note 20, at 44-45.
29. Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court, and in the Court for the
Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors, of the State of New York: Esek Cowen,




the domestication of the common law by putting adjudicatory
authority in a form appropriate to American political preferences.
Furthermore, written opinions together with official reporting gave
Americans the kind of direct access to authoritative texts that their
history had disposed them to regard as a central feature of legitimacy.
Finally, by reducing the responsibilities of reporters, official reporting
and written decisions began to turn the dissemination of cases into a
standardized process of government publication akin to the
established practice of publishing statutes. The form of adjudicatory
authority was thus further assimilated to that of statutory authority,
thereby underscoring the identification of adjudication as a product
of positivist government, not custom. All these developments cast
common law authority in a form which enabled it to thrive despite
opposition.
III. CHANGES IN THE FORM OF REPORTS
American adjudicatory authority also protected itself against
democratic or reformist incursions through changes in its material
form. Chief among these changes was the increasingly common
appearance of American decisions in writing. As Warner has argued
with respect to the Constitution, Americans required that fundamen-
tal authority be created through the issuance of an authoritative
writing by a body, which, like a constitutional convention, was not
already an established source of sovereign power.30 Similarly, adjudi-
catory authority-another kind of fundamental authority-acquired
needed legitimacy through the establishment of a system in which
authoritative writing (case reports) was issued by a body which was
not already an established source of authority (the affiliation of
legislature, reporters, and judges).
American confidence in the power of writing was strong,31
particularly when compared to attitudes toward custom. Indeed, one
review states that one of the main purposes of reporting is "to rescue
[legal doctrines] from the fallacious and uncertain guardianship of
tradition. '' 32 Tradition, from this perspective, was not the ground of
30. See WARNER, supra note 1, at 103-04.
31. See, e.g., LARZER ZIFF, WRITING IN THE NEW NATION: PROSE, PRINT, AND POLITICS
IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES 93-94 (1991).
32. Law Reports, 18 N. AM. REv. 371, 374 (1824) (reviewing 8 HENRY WHEATON,
REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES (1823); 20 WILLIAM JOHNSON, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN
THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1823); and 17 DUDLEY ATKINS TYNG, REPORTS OF CASES
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common law legal authority or the prerequisite of legal certainty but
rather the abyss into which common law principles were liable to fall
in the absence of the preservative powers of writing. Writing, not
custom, was thus the best guardian of the common law.
The material embodiment of authority in written form may have
had an even more powerful effect with respect to adjudication than it
did with respect to the Constitution. First, the location of native
legislative and executive power in writing had a long history in
America, while written public embodiments of American adjudica-
tory authority were few prior to the publication of the first American
case reports. Presenting the acts of American courts to the public in
writing constituted a radical change in the public face of American
adjudication.
Furthermore, members of the legal profession, particularly those
most influential in shaping the conception of the common law in
America, must have experienced a marked alteration in their physical
and psychological relationship to American adjudication upon the
appearance of American case reports in print. While lawyers had
always produced notes of decisions for personal use and while some
manuscript collections of reports were circulated, 3  the dissemination
of standard volumes of reports gave the legal profession a truly
common literature of American decisional law for the first time. The
sense of a common literature and a common legal community that the
availability of reports produced was not restricted to each individual
jurisdiction; rather, as indicated by the frequency with which out-of-
state cases were cited in decisions during the early nineteenth
century,34 reporting permitted lawyers and judges to conceive of a
national common law in a way that they could not have done before.
The reports may thus have worked to counteract that portion of anti-
common law feeling which derived from the view that a unitary
American common law could not exist.35 Furthermore, the reports
may have allowed common law adjudication to benefit from
nationalistic and anti-English sentiments, particularly strong after the
War of 1812, which had earlier served to undermine common law
ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN MASSACHUSETTS (1823)).
33. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 323.
34. See id. at 325; SURRENCY, supra note 20, at 39; Law Reports, supra note 32, at 374
(noting that reports of Johnson and Tyng are cited where they have no authority as legal
precedent and that "they have thus exercised a useful influence far beyond the limits of the
states which they control").




The character of American common law was also shaped by the
fact that case reporting was predominantly a print genre. Manuscript
reporting certainly persisted at least into the Republican period,36 but
it seems likely that it was considered a vestige of the subordinate
position that American decisional law had occupied prior to the
Revolution. Furthermore, due to the ideological role of print in the
revolution and (again as Warner has argued) in the legitimization of
the U.S. Constitution, it seems unlikely that manuscript reports could
have been considered to be fully legitimate embodiments of
American legal authority. Warner, describing the special significance
of print in the early United States, explained that "the social diffusion
of printed artifacts took on the investment of the disinterested virtue
of the public orientation, as opposed to the corrupting interests and
passions of particular and local persons. '37 Thus, in the particular
environment of the early Republic, print helped fortify the claim of
American decisional law to being "common" at a time when the
traditional meaning of that component of "common law" had been
undermined by the break with England. Print involved a different
meaning of commonality; instead of a commonality based on shared
historical practices, the printed character of the reports identified
American common law as something devoted to the public benefit.
By putting caselaw into a form which affiliated it with the public
good, the rise of reporting may have contributed to the instrumental-
ist conceptions of common law decision-making that developed in the
decades after the Revolution.
Another matter of reporting form involved the status of
arguments of counsel. Reviewers frequently addressed this question,
38
and one summarized the various approaches to the problem:
Some have doubted the expediency of giving much space to [the
arguments of counsel], saying that the case and the opinion of the
court present all that is decided, together with the authorities, and
the grounds of the decision. In many cases, in some reports .. ., on
36. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 323.
37. WARNER, supra note 1, at 108; see also Michael Warner, Franklin and the Letters of the
Republic, 16 REPRESENTATIONS 110, 116 (1986) (stating that the public nature of print makes it
"the ideal and idealized guardian of civic liberty, as print discourse exposes corruption in its
lurking holes but does so without occupying a lurking hole of its own"); ZIFF, supra note 31, at
102 (noting Warner's generalization that the relation of print to civic liberty is "acute").
38. See Adams, supra note 15, at 510 (praising reports in part on ground that "arguments of
counsel are sparingly given"); Judge Yeates' Reports, 1 J. JURISPRUDENCE 413, 415 (1821)
(reviewing JASPER YEATES, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA (1817-1818)) (praising Yeates' "condensation of arguments of counsel").
1998]
CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW
the contrary, the arguments of counsel are given, and the opinion of
the court omitted; the reporter tells us that such and such were the
arguments of counsel on each side, and such was the decree of the
court, and leaves the reader to conjecture the grounds of decision.
The opinion is certainly to be preferred to the arguments, if one
only is to be given; but it is better to report both where the question
is difficult or important .... 9
The rise of the written opinion probably contributed to the
uncertainty noted here about the value of reporting arguments of
counsel. Detailed accounts of the arguments at bar must have been
much more useful in the absence of a comprehensive determination
of the case from the pen of a judge. Further along in the same review,
the reviewer addresses a practice repeatedly complained of: the
inclusion of "a great deal of the declamation of the counsel, including
rhetorical flourishes, flights of fancy, and appeals from the
understanding to the imagination, all literally recorded with as great
fidelity, as if the reporter were a sworn stenographer. ' ' 40 The lengthy,
elaborate performances characteristic of oral argument during the
period had little appeal in print, especially for the practitioner whose
time, patience, and pocketbook were already being taxed by the
expansion in legal publishing. Again, the inevitable juxtaposition of
the arguments and the opinions probably worked to the detriment of
the former; one reviewer complained that the arguments sometimes
included "language [which] does not seem to be rigidly forensic and
juridical. ''41 The implicit standard for appropriate juridical language,
of course, was that of the surrounding print-oriented material,
dominated by the opinions.
These concerns regarding the arguments of counsel reflect the
increased emphasis on the opinion and on textuality that the rise of
written decisions produced. Adjudication had taken yet another step
in the long march away from the oral, collaborative process recorded
in the Year Books and toward the overwhelmingly text-based
juridical culture that Americans inhabit today. In accordance with the
legal and political ideology of the early nineteenth century, reports of
the period portrayed adjudication as centering upon authoritative
written statements rather than discussions among experts. Analysis in
39. Pickering's Reports, supra note 14, at 187. The reviewer goes on to explain that
reporting the arguments is valuable because it forces judges to issue more thorough opinions,
because it gives attorneys credit for their contributions to the law, and because it clarifies the
meaning of the opinions. See id. at 188.
40. Id.
41. Recent Reports, 3 AM. JURIST 314, 317 (1830).
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periodicals and treatises was thus able to begin replacing courtroom
discourse as the main medium of public conversation about common
law rules in America. Both these developments helped transform the
common law from an institution focused on the relation between a
body of knowledge and its guardians to one that focused upon the
relation between authoritative texts and the public they governed.
CONCLUSION
Begun as a nationalistic effort directed at improving judicial
functioning, the rise of American reporting helped transform the
common law from an institution theoretically based on the
application of immemorial custom to one based on the production of
authoritative texts for public dissemination. By reconstructing itself in
a form which appealed to the American preference for authority
constituted in print and which minimized fears of arbitrary,
antidemocratic judicial power, the common law in America was able
not only to protect itself against the codifiers, but also to establish
conditions under which courts could exercise more power than
common law courts ever had before. Freed from the conservatism of
custom, empowered by the authority to hand down written law, and
insulated by the republican connotations of print, courts could take
an instrumental approach to adjudication without suffering serious
consequences. Administered in a form resembling statute, judicial
legislation was easier to swallow. Adjudicatory authority thus
succeeded not by defending its established principles but by adopting
the attitudes and some of the trappings of the institutions and
movements that threatened it.
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